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of the Criminal Code and of the law reform process involved in those amendments,
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than any other branch of the law, criminal law rides at
the forefront of public consciousness. It is not a field reserved
exclusively for the legal experts. In 1985, there were two well-
publicized amendments to the Canada Crininal Code' which altered
the law on impaired driving2 and prostitutions In both instances,
the formal changes were preceded, if not galvanized by, extensive
public pressure, debate, and consultation. Meanwhile, the
government, the federal Law Reform Commission, lawyers, and legal
scholars are involved in the lengthy process of a major,
comprehensive revision of the Criminal Code (which last occurred in
1953).! As P.H. Solomon indicates in his analysis of criminal justice
policy, the federal government has, since the mid-1960s, faced
increasing pressure to maximize rationality in decision-making by
1 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
2 S.C. 1985, c. 19.
3 S.C. 1985, c. 50.
4 S.C. 1953-54, c. 51.
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justifying initiatives with research and evaluation. It is against this
background of a generally public and publicized process that this
article will examine another recent criminal law amendment.
One of Parliament's final legislative acts of 1985 was to pass
the Curininal Code (Lotteries) Amendment Act.6 Despite the fact
that significant changes were made to the law regulating lotteries
and gaming, they went virtually unnoticed. Gambling is certainly of
no less prurient interest than other forms of criminal activity, yet the
amending process was confined to a few federal and provincial
officials. The exclusion of the academic community is perhaps
understandable, as it has consistently given little attention to this
area of the criminal law. Both the implications of the latest
amendments and the amending process itself merit further scrutiny,
for they reveal interesting insights into law reform, the criminal law,
and the constitutional law of Canada.
II. GAMING LEGISLATION IN CANADA
In order to comprehend the import of the present state of
the law pertaining to gaming, it is necessary to understand how it
evolved.7 Part V of the Criminal Code ("Disorderly Houses, Gaming
and Betting"), unlike much of Canadian criminal law, has its origins
in English statute law rather than in common law. It is a legislative,
rather than a judicial creation. Fencing, for example, was one of
the earliest gaming pursuits and was prohibited by statute in 1285.8
P.H. Solomon Jr., "Government Officials and the Study of Policy Making" (1983) 26
Can. Pub. Admin. 420 at 422.
6 S.0. 1985, c. 52.
7 The most comprehensive survey of the legislative history of gaming laws is found in a
R.C.M.P. in-house study: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Gaming Specialist Field
Understudy Program, The Histoy of die Law of Gaming in Canada (Research Paper No. 1)
by Sgt. R.G. Robinson (Edmonton: National Gaming Section, R.C.M.P., 1983).
8 13 Edward I, c. 7.
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Canadian legislation has it deepest roots in a 1338 statute9
passed when the monarch feared losing all his skilled archers to
"idle" games of dice. As a result, all games, except for archery, were
prohibited. As one commentator notes, it is that blanket
prohibition, eroded by centuries of amendment and repeal, which is
with us today, "a patchwork of fossilized law.'10
In the colonial fashion, English legislation was extended to
Canada. After Confederation, the various gaming laws were reduced
to a general statute relating to lotteries and gaming,-, and this was
substantially re-enacted in the first Ciminal Code in 1892.12
Keeping common gaming houses, conducting lotteries (with limited
exceptions), cheating at play, and gambling in public conveyances
were prohibited. When the Code was revised in 1953, the only
changes made to the gaming sections were definitional ones. The
Criminal Code Revision Commission was certainly aware of
inconsistencies and anomalies in the legislation, but advocated no
substantive changes "because of the controversial nature of the
matters involved."13 Shortly thereafter, however, a joint committee
of both chambers of Parliament was struck with the curious mandate
of reviewing capital and corporal punishment, and lotteries.
Regarding the latter, it first noted that the law had always been
dealt with piecemeal, never having been subjected to a thorough
revision 4 Furthermore, the joint committee recommended new
legislation providing workable laws capable of effective enforcement
12 Richard II, c. 6.
10 G.E. Glickman, "Our gaming laws: conditions dicey, to say the least" (March, 1979)
3 Can. Law. 11.
11 An Act Respecting Gaming Houses, S.C. 1886, c. 158.
12 55.56 Vict. c. 29.
13 Canada, Senate, Debates of tie Senate of Canada, 6th Sess., 21st Parl., (1952) at 233,
quoted in L-J. Ryan, "Commentary: Criminal Code Lottery Section" (1968) 11 Can. B. 3. 470
at 473.
14 Canada, Reports of the Joint Committee of tie Senate and House of Commons on
Capital Punshmen4 Corporal Punishmen4 and Lotteries (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 27 June,
11 July, and 31 July 1956).
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and garnering public support. Clarity, the elimination of
inconsistencies, and the supervision and control of permitted
lotteries were the main thrust of its conclusions:15
The implementation of this policy will result in the effective prohibition and
restriction of several types of lotteries now carried on in spite of their dubious
legality. It will also result in some relaxation of existing prohibitions to permit
adequate and workable control. It is precisely because the committee has
concluded that the present prohibitory laws do not protect the public that it is
disposed to recommend some relaxation in line with the same reforms introduced
with respect to the control, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
Prohibition proved unworkable and led to many serious abuses; but the present
system of licensing and control ... has worked satisfactorily and on the whole
appears to have contributed to efficient law enforcement.1 6
These recommendations were not acted upon until late in
1967,17 but this initial legislative proposal died when Parliament was
dissolved for the 1968 election. In 1969, however, Justice Minister
John Turner was successful in securing the enactment of major
changes to gaming legislation! 8
The relaxation proposed in 1956 was achieved, but in a
rather unusual way. Section 190 of the Code, as amended,
permitted the Government of Canada to conduct lottery schemes;
more importantly, however, it also allowed the provinces to conduct
or authorize lottery schemes' 9 For example, it became lawful for
a charitable or religious organization "under the authority of a
licence issued by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council of a province"
to conduct and manage a lottery scheme in that province.20
More will be said below on the constitutionality of this
arrangement. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that since
15 Jbid at paras. 20-22.
16 Id. at para. 22.
1 7 Bill C-195 (1967).
18 S.C. 1968-69, c. 38.
19 It is important to note that that "lottery scheme" encompasses not only lotteries but
other games of chance such as blackjack and roulette, although dice games are not included.
20 Supra, note 1, s. 190(1)(c).
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1969, the gaming provisions of the Code have been unique.2 1
Criminal laws generally conform to a pattern of prohibition plus
sanction, with legally recognized excuses and justifications. With
gaming, however, while there is a prohibition plus a sanction, these
do not apply to a broad range of provincially regulated exemptions.
Ill. CRIMINAL CODE (LOTTERIES) AMENDMENT ACT, 1985
Since 1969, lotteries have become firmly entrenched in
Canadian culture 2 2 They have proliferated at the provincial level.
In some provinces, Alberta and Manitoba for example, bingo and
casino gambling have also been well established. At the federal
level, however, developments have not been as smooth. The
operation by the federal government of Lotto Canada and the
Sports Pool Corporation provoked provincial opposition and
litigation. In 1979, the short-lived Conservative government agreed
with the provinces that it would no longer operate federal lotteries24
but was unable to formalize the agreement until December, 1985.
As a result, Parliament has divested the federal government of any
capacity to conduct lotteries. The provinces now have sole
jurisdiction over lotteries and other specific gaming operations, and
that jurisdiction is much broader than in the initial grant of power
in 1969.
This step was achieved largely by executive action.
Parliament merely "rubber-stamped" an agreement negotiated by
federal and provincial government officials. Following a conspicuous
21 There are only two remotely similar provisions: s. 81 exempts provincially authorized
boxing matches from the prohibition against prize fights; s. 251 gives the provincial Minister
of Health powers of supervision over therapeutic abortion committees.
22 Canadian culture has also become heavily dependent on lotteries for funding. See
Canada Council, Research & Evaluation, Lotteries and theArts: The Canadian Eqerpence 1970
to 1980, rev'd ed. (Working Paper 600-13, July 1982).
23 For an analysis of gaming in Alberta see C.S. Campbell and J.R. Ponting, "rhe
Evolution of Casino Gambling in Alberta" (1984) 10 Can. Pub. Pol. 142.
24 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1st Sess., 33rd Pan., Vol. VI at 8416 (6 Nov.
1985).
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absence of public hearings or discussion, the lotteries bill was given
first reading in the House of Commons on 10 October, second and
third readings on 6 November, and finally passed after less than
three hours of debate; in the Senate it was given first reading 7
November, second reading on 27 November, and third reading and
assent on 20 December. It was proclaimed in force on the final day
of the year.25
The process and substance of this amendment will now be
subjected to closer analysis.
IV. CONTRACTUAL CRIMINAL LAW
This heading, although apparently puzzling, is an accurate
description of the most recent gaming legislation. A reading of the
sparse discussion in the House of Commons and the rather more
comprehensive enquiries of the Senate Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs reveals that this was criminal law
engineered largely by ministers responsible for lotteries, reduced to
a contract containing a consideration clause.26 In exchange for the
federal government relinquishing any claim to conduct lotteries and
reinforcing the provinces' control of lotteries and gaming, the
provinces agreed to contribute one hundred million dollars to the
Calgary Winter Olympic Games. The contract, dated 3 June 1985,
was contingent on the amendments to the Code being proclaimed no
later than December 31, 1985. This was achieved largely due to an
all-party agreement in the House of Commons to have second and
third readings on the same afternoon. A brief discussion in the
Commons was substituted for a reference to the Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. The Senate gave the
proposals a closer examination but, despite serious reservations,
25 S186-5 (22 Jan. 1986), Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 120, No. 2 at 468.
26 Canada, Senate, .Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs. 1st Sess., 33rd Pad. Vol. 31, Append'k "Leg-31-C' (4 De. 1985).
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ultimately concluded that they should be "approved without
amendment."27
Unquestionably, both levels of government may enter into
contracts and may sue and be sued on the basis of them. Here,
though, they are not contracting to have buildings constructed or to
have office supplies delivered, but to terminate litigation and re-
apportion governmental power in return for substantial consideration
in accordance with strict time limits. This brings a new dimension
to federalism in that its terms have become negotiable for cash.
The Senate Committee was concerned enough about this
development to seek a legal opinion. Counsel expressed the
following viewpoint:
In my opinion the subject matter of this agreement is clearly the exercise of powers
of executive government. The contract is entered into by ministers who represent
governments of which they are members. I would submit that the resulting
agreement is not a private contract but a political arrangement.... [IlJ there is a
breach of those political commitments, the proper forum for the resolution would
not be the Court; the proper forum would be in the political chambers of
government.
8
In other words, the contract, being in reality a mere political
commitment, was not legally binding and not justiciable. As events
transpired, this opinion was not put to the test. The contractual
format was eminently successful in the present case. Perhaps it
matters little that, de jure, the governments were not bound by the
contract so long as they and Parliament felt bound de facto.
V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL POWER
Law reform, in this instance, was either a bureaucratic or
executive process, but not a legislative one. In large part, this
results from the transformation of gaming legislation into a federal-
provincial issue, and, as D.V. Smiley and others have pointed out,
27bld. vol. 35 at 15 (16 Dec. 1986).
28 Jbid vol. 34 at 12 (13 Dec. 1986).
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federal-provincial relations in Canada are characterized by the
dominance of the executive branches of both levels of government.29
At Confederation, the criminal law power was reserved
exclusively for the federal government.3 ° It was to be a tool to
promote national unity. Burgeoning provincial interest in the legal
control of gambling, a sphere constitutionally allotted to the federal
government, goes beyond a general concern over how the country
is run. It may be attributable in part to the well-documented
increase in provincial assertiveness!' One observer notes that,
apparently, the majority of federal systems are becoming more
centralized; Canada, however, with the development of nationally
oriented interest groups and nationally experienced needs, has
moved in the opposite direction.3 2 Smiley, the doyen of Canadian
political science, describes this development as the "explicit
denigration" of the Canadian constitution and "the attenuation of
federal power."33  Thus, "Canada's ten provinces are vigorous,
activist units, jealous of their powers and anxious to use them."34
There is, however, little evidence that in the initial stages,
the provinces as a group actively sought jurisdiction over lotteries
and gaming, although Quebec had been advocating provincial control
of lotteries since the 1930s and had gained the support, in 1963, of
29 D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3d ed. (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980) at 91.
30 Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., a 3, s. 91(27).
31 A. Cairns, "'The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism" (1979) 22 Can. Pub. Admin.
175; F.3. Fletcher & D.C. Wallace, "Federal-Provincial Relations and the Making of Public
Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies" in R. Simeon, ed., Division of Powers and Public
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 125-205; R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial
Diplomacy: Tet Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1972); Smiley, supra, note 29; and Solomon Jr., supra, note 5 at 422.
32 Simeon, supra, note 31 at 9.
33 Smiley, supra, note 29 at 57.
34 Simeon, supra, note 31 at 10.
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the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities.35 During
the debates regarding the 1969 amendments which resulted in the
first transfer of power, the Minister of Justice was asked if the
provinces had made any representations to have the law changed.
He responded:
To the best of our knowledge ... we have received no formal submissions either for
or against this particular provision from any provincial government. We are
assessing public opinion in this country. We feel that public opinion is not
unanimous about it and that it might vary from region to region. We are,
therefore, leaving it to the regions, as that public opinion may be interpreted by
their provincial governments that their provincial Attorneys General have control
over whether or not there should be lotteries permitted within provincial
boundaries. 
6
Thus, the conversion of gaming and lotteries from a matter
of federal criminal law to a joint federal-provincial issue appears to
have resulted from a federal initiative. At this point, it is interesting
to note that a similar absence of unanimity regarding obscene
publications has not led to a divestment of federal control.
Rationality notwithstanding, the provinces were granted a
direct role in gaming control. Not only did the 1969 amendment
expand their jurisdiction, but it also had a significant revenue
generating potential which was soon realizedY Therefore, it is not
surprising that since 1969 the provinces have been jealously guarding
these interests within the context of federal-provincial negotiations,
as well as in the courts from time to time. 8
35 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1st Sess., 28th Pan., Vol. 5, at 5476 (13 Feb.
1969).
36 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,
Proceedings, No. 9 (11 Mar. 1959) at 331. This conforms to a development discussed by J.H.
Skolnick and J. Dombrink. a shift from the relative conceptual simplicity of criminal
prohibition to the subtlety and complexity of administrative regulation. See 'The Legalization
of Deviance' (1978) 16 Criminology 193 at 194.
37 For example, in 1984-85, the members of the Western Canada Lotteries Foundation
(B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, the Yukon and N.W.T.) generated net revenues of
$166.5 million on sales of $483.5 million. Western Canada Lottery Foundation, Eleventh
Annual Report 1984-85 (Winnipeg: 1985).
38 For example, a case launched by the Attorneys General of all Provinces and the
Interprovincial Lottery Corporation against the federal Crown was dropped as part of the 1985
agreement to amend the Criminal Code.
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VI. THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL PROCESS: LOTrERIES
AND GAMING
The federal-provincial negotiation process, in recent years,
has been characterized by the virtual exclusion of legislative bodies
and of relevant non-governmental interests.39 As F.J. Fletcher and
D.C. Wallace observe, it is de rigeur to view with alarm the tendency
for federal-provincial agreements to be made with little or no
reference to legislatures. Where legislation is forthcoming (and
many agreements can be implemented without it), governments are
generally loathe to make changes in hard-won agreements in order
to satisfy legislators. Any debate tends to be slight and
inconsequential. They note further that members of opposition
parties are nearly always completely blocked out of the process.
Much of the time, therefore, federal-provincial interaction is "a
closed bureaucratic loop."40  Constitutional scholar P.W. Hogg
comments that while it must be frustrating for legislators to find that
their role is confined to ratifying arrangements made elsewhere,
Parliament is too dominated by Cabinet and the party system to be
a suitable forum for federal-provincial adjustment'
It is important to recognize that executive federalism is more a consequence than
a cause of the general weakness of legislatures in the face of the executive
dominance of modem parliamentary systems. It seems clear, however, that joint
programs do help to shield governments from effective legislative scrutiny.... There
is little doubt that the practitioners of federal-provincial bargaining prefer secrecy42
This pattern certainly holds true for the 1985 amendments to
Canadian lotteries and gaming legislation. Federal-provincial
negotiations occurred primarily between the federal Minister of State
for Fitness and Amateur Sport and provincial ministers responsible
39 One of the most enlightening discussions of federal-provincial relations is found in
Fletcher & Wallace, supra, note 31.
4 0 Jbid at 128-29, 186-88.
41 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 108.
42 Fletcher & Wallace, supra, note 31 at 186.
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for revenue and lotteries. It was only in the final stages of this
process that there was any consultation with the federal Department
of Justice and the provincial Attorneys General, which is noteworthy
in itself, given the responsibility that these ministers have for
criminal justice policy. As a result of their input, some amendments
were made to the Bill, but none were inconsistent with the
substance of the proposals contained in the federal-provincial lottery
agreement signed in June, 1985. Within six months, as has been
indicated, the Bill became law almost automatically.
The abbreviation of the legislative process was criticized
before the Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.
One witness contrasted it with the "normal criminal law amendment
process." Although there was some overstatement on his part, as
very few legislative changes go through all or even most of the steps
outlined below, it is informative nonetheless to compare these steps
with the actual process of the lotteries amendment. Ideally
legislative reform would take the following form:
1. The generation of an idea for change coming from government,
an interest group, or the Uniform Law Conference.
2. A study of the idea instituted by the federal Department of
Justice.
3. Review by the Law Reform Commission or the Criminal Code
Revision Committee.
4. Multilateral and bilateral consultation betveen the federal
Department of Justice and the appropriate provincial ministers
5. The development of a position at the ministerial level.
6. A cabinet position based on the ministerial recommendation.
7. The preparation and circulation of a legislative draft followed by
a draft bill.
8. Introduction of the bill in the House of Commons with referral
to the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs.
9. Referral to and discussion in Senate.4 3
Given that the criminal law is a blunt and weighty instrument
of social control, any substantial curtailment of this process should
give cause for concern. Is it appropriate, for example, for Criminal
43 From the evidence of H. Morton, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General.
Proceedings of the Senate Standing Committee, supra, note 26, vol. 31 at 18-19.
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Code amendments to be made in exchange for cash payments and
for the changes to be rationalized as representing "good fiscal
responsibility? 44
The 1985 lotteries amendment has set a disconcerting
precedent both in terms of the process followed and the impact on
the definition of criminal law in this country. Were the federal and
provincial governments to agree, a similar process could be used to
amend several areas of the criminal law - prostitution, obscene
publications, food and drug, and anti-combines law being the more
obvious examples. The federal government could pass legislation
allowing the provinces to license and regulate aspects of these
activities. Not only does this facilitate inter-provincial
inconsistencies, but it also reduces governmental accountability. As
G. Stevenson points out, a government cannot easily be held
responsible for its actions if it can plausibly blame their
consequences, or lack thereof, on another level of government that
is either competitively or co-operatively involved in the same field of
activity 5
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL JTJRISDICTION OVER LOTITERIES
AND GAMING
In addition to these concerns, there is a central issue arising
out of Canadian gaming laws that has been largely ignored: the
legality of the transfer of power between the federal and provincial
governments commenced in 1969 and reinforced in 1985. Section
190 of the Criminal Code empowers the provinces to enact
legislation and to administer licensing schemes authorizing lotteries
and gaming. This limits the application of the Code while
concomitantly expanding the jurisdiction of the provinces.
Were it not for the exemptions laid out in the Criminal
Code, it is clear that provincial legislatures would have no
44 Ibld, vol. 29 (26 Nov. 1985) at 15, per Otto Jelinek, Minister of State for Amateur
Sport and Fitness.
45 G. Stevenson, "The Division of Powers" in R. Simeon, Division of Powers and Public
Poliy, supra, note 31, 71-123 at 114. See also Smiley, supra, note 29 at 53.
1988]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
jurisdiction to permit the operation of lottery schemes otherwise
prohibited by the Code. 6  Attempts by the provinces to create
additional regulation of gaming practices have also been struck down
as being ultra vires. In R. v. Lamontagne,47 for example, a majority
of the Ontario Court of Appeal found the Ontario Gaming and
Betting Act, 194248 to be invalid. The Act provided that a court
could order the closing, for a period of up to a year of premises in
respect of which there had been, within the previous three months,
a conviction under the disorderly house, betting, and bookmaking
provisions of the Code. The Court found that the statute operated
essentially as criminal law in a field already covered by the federal
Code. Similarly, in $ohnson v. Attorney General for Alberta,49 a
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that the Slot
Machine Act50 was outside the jurisdiction of the province of
Alberta. That Act provided for the confiscation of slot machines,
relying on the provincial power over property and civil rights, and
matters of a local or private nature /51 This contention was rejected
by the majority. Rand I. stated that the Code dealt comprehensively
with the subject matter of the provincial statute, which patently was
that of gambling. Deploring this attempt to displace the Code, he
concluded that any local legislation of a supplementary nature that
would tend to weaken or confuse that enforcement would amount
to interference with the exclusive power of Parliaments 2 More
important for present purposes is the opinion expressed by Locke J.:
4 6 Supra, note 14 at para. 3. See also Re Morrison and Kingston, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 740
(Ont. C.A.); R v. Stanley (1952), 104 C.C.C. 31 (Ata. S.C.).
47 [1945] 4 D.L.R. 161 (Ont. CA.).
48 S.O. 1942, c. 19.
49 [1954] S.C.R. 127.
50 R.S.A. 1942, c. 333.
51 Supra, note 30 at ss. 92(13) and 92(16).
52 Supra, note 49 at 138.
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The determination of this matter does not, in my opinion, depend alone upon the
fact that if the provincial legislation was lawfully enacted there would be a direct
clash with the terms of the Criminal Code; rather it is my opinion that the main
reason is that the exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in relation to gaming lies with
Parliament under head 27 of section 91:53
The courts have been quite clear on the matter: the
regulation of lotteries and gaming is a federal responsibility. A.S.
Abel points out, however, that this federal authority in relation to
criminal law comprises not only the creation of new crimes, but also
the legalization of conduct which was criminal at Confederation or
which was subsequently proscribed as criminal5 4 What must be
explored here is whether conduct can be "legalized" by explicitly
transferring regulatory control to the provinces, or whether such
transfers amount to a misuse of the federal criminal law power? It
is helpful to look to another section of the Code for guidance.
In 1969, the Canadian government relaxed its prohibition
against abortion by exempting abortions approved by provincially
regulated therapeutic abortion committees. In Morgentaler v. R ,5-
the Supreme Court had to address, inter alia, a challenge to the
constitutionality of the abortion law and its transfer of power, a
challenge which it ultimately' dismissed. The Chief Justice alone
addressed himself to the transfer issue and was of the opinion that
"Parliament may determine what is not criminal as well as what is,
and may hence introduce dispensations or exemptions in its criminal
legislation."5 6 In P.W. Hogg's view, this interpretation seems too
broad since it would permit the kind of regulatory scheme in the
guise of criminal law that has been consistently nullified in the
past 57
Supra, note 49 at 155.
54 A.S. Abel, ed., Laskin's Canadian Constiutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1975) at 825.
55 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616.
5 6 id. at 626-27.
5 7 Hogg, supra, note 41 at 417.
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In a number of cases, the courts have declared that the
criminal law will not sustain the establishment of an elaborate
regulatory scheme in which an administrative agency or official
exercises discretionary powers, this being within provincial
jurisdiction 8 While Hogg characterizes section 190 of the Code as
including a power of dispensation granted to an administrative
agency (the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council), he expresses no
opinion as to its validity 59 Instead, he posits, but does not apply, a
test of "colourability": "[W!he more elaborate the regulatory scheme,
the more likely it is that the Court will classify the dispensation or
exemption as being regulatory rather than criminal."60  It is
debatable whether this or a similar test would result in section 190
being struck down as beyond the federal criminal law power.
VIII. FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL INTERDELEGATION
Is the lotteries amendment valid on the grounds that the
federal government has merely delegated its power to the provinces?
To an increasing extent, legislative bodies are unable to enact all
necessary legislation for effective government. The common pattern
is for Parliament or a provincial legislature to legislate a skeletal
legislative scheme and delegate to a subordinate body the power to
enact the details.61 In the Ctirninal Code, Parliament has outlined
general exemptions from the prohibition of gaming and lotteries,
leaving the authorization, licensing, and control of the exceptions to
the provinces. The latter, however, are not subordinate to the
federal authority; they are co-ordinate or equal in status. 62
58 For example, Re Board of Cormnerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191; Attorney General of
Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] AC. 328 (P.C.).
59 Hogg, supra, note 41 at 417.
60 Ibid.
61 This was judicially approved in Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 8 AC. 117 (P.C.).
62 Ibid at 80.
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Unlike its Australian counterpart, the Canadian constitution
has no express power of interdelegation between federal and
provincial authorities. One view is that there is in fact a
constitutional prohibition against it; the inclusion of "exclusively' in
section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 precludes the authorization
of a delegation of legislative power to any body including a
provincial legislature.63 The courts, however, have been somewhat
more ambivalent, moving from an absolute rejection to the creation
of exemptions.
During argument in C.P.R. v. Notre Dame de Bonsecours,64
Lord Watson is reported to have stated:
The Dominion cannot give jurisdiction, or leave jurisdiction, with the province. The
provincial parliament cannot give legislative jurisdiction to the Dominion parliament.
If they have it, either one or the other of them, they have it by virtue of the Act
of 1867. I think we must get rid of the idea that either one or the other can
enlarge the jurisdiction of the other or surrender jurisdiction.65
A Royal Commission on Dominion-provincial relations,
reporting in 1940, supported the idea of delegation; 66 but, a decade
later, in the so-called Nova Scotia Interdelegation case, the Supreme
Court rejected as unconstitutional an interdelegation of powers
between Parliament and a provincial legislature.67 The decision was,
in P.W. Hogg's opinion, based on the view that such interdelegation
would disturb the scheme of the distribution of powers as set out in
the Constitution Act, 1867. Parliament and the legislatures should
not be permitted to agree to alter that pattern in the absence of
63 E.A. Driedger, "The Interaction of Federal and Provincial Law" (1976) 54 Can. B.
Rev. 695 at 698.
64 [1899] A.C. 367 (P.C.), quoted by Driedger, supra, note 63 at 697. This remark of
Lord Watson was made in argument. Although not technically binding, it has been highly
persuasive in subsequent cases.
65 Jbid at 373.
66 Referred to in Abel, supra, note 54 at 2. Interestingly, a more recent government-
commissioned study took a similar position: Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future
Together Observations and Recommendations (Hull: Supply and Services Canada, 1979) at
104.
6 7 Attorney General for Nova Scotia v. Attorney General for Canada, 119521 S.C.R. 31.
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explicit constitutional authority; there being none, the Court would
allow none to be implied.68
Nbnetheless, it soon became clear that this decision was to
have a restricted application. The Nova Scotia statute at issue in
that case concerned the delegation of powers between legislative
bodies. It woulId have authorized the provincial government to
delegate to Parliament the power to legislate with respect to
employment in areas under provincial jurisdiction. Reciprocally, the
Nova Scotia legislature was to receive from Parliament the power to
make laws in relation to employment in industries under federal
jurisdiction.69 What was struck down was an interdelegation of law-
making power that was beyond the delegate's legislative authority.
Thus, as Abel indicates, there is no unconstitutional delegation
involved where there is no enlargement of the legislative authority
of the referred legislature, but rather a mere borrowing of provisions
"which are within its competence and which were enacted for its
own purposes."70
In relation to section 190 of the Criminal Code, therefore,
the issue is whether it extends provincial powers or merely borrows
them. Can the control of gambling be brought under one of the
provincial heads of power laid out in the constitution? On the one
hand we have seen the judgement of Locke J. in Johnson 7 which
maintained that Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in
relation to lotteries and gaming. On the other hand, the decision in
Provincial Secretary of P.E.I. v. Egan72 upheld the right of the
province to enact a licensing scheme for motor vehicles and
68 Hogg, supra, note 41 at 296.
69 P.H. Russell, Leading Constitutional Decisions, 3d ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1984) at 470-71. See P.E.. Marketing Board v. H.B. Willis Inc, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392,
where the Supreme Court held that Parliament may delegate to a board of another
legislature's creation.
70 Abel, supra, note 54 at 3; G.V. La Forest, "Delegation of Legislative Power in Canada"
(1975) 21 McGill LI. 131 at 138; Attorney General of Ontario v. Scott, [1956] S.C.R. 137.
71 Supra, note 49.
72 [1941] S.C.IL 396.
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penalties for contravention of licensing conditions. Thus, as long as
provincial gambling regulations can be characterized as a licensing
scheme rather than as an extension of punishment for a criminal
offence, it would appear arguable that they would be valid as
pertaining to the regulation of business within a province.
This is certainly in keeping with the tenor of the major
Canadian constitutional law texts in which there is an assumption of
validity.73 It is also consistent with the widely accepted presumption
of the constitutional validity of provincial legislation.74 Nonetheless,
on close examination, section 190 is perilously close to constituting
an invalid interdelegation. After all, the provinces have jurisdiction
over lottery schemes solely because the federal Parliament has
granted them the power to make exemptions from the general
prohibition. Strictly speaking, this provision does not merely
"borrow" independently valid provincial enactments. The latter
would be invalid but for the terms of section 190 itself.
Nonetheless, it has been characterized as permissable referential or
conditional legislation as permitted by the constitution and can be
more fully explored in that context.
IX. REFERENTIAL AND CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION
These are two techniques of legislative co-operation between
the federal and provincial governments that have been frequently
used in the past and which, in principle at least, were not affected
by the Nova Scotia Interdelegation case. As defined by P.H. Russell,
referential legislation incorporates the valid enactments of another
legislative body; conditional legislation makes the carrying out of the
policy stated in a statute conditional upon the act of another
governmental agency.75 The distinction between the two is not
73 Abel, supra, note 54 at 825; Hogg, supra, note 41 at 47.
74 See the majority decision of Ritchie . in Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors and McNeil
(1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 20.
75 Russell, supra, note 69 at 471.
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always clear-cut. Neither is the line always obvious between these
two mechanisms and interdelegation.
The key cases in this area concern the federal Lord's Day
Act. In 1903, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, then the
Canadian court of last resort, struck down Ontario's Lord's Day Act
as an encroachment on the federal criminal law power.76 Hogg
notes that, prior to this decision, it had been widely assumed that
Sunday observance was within provincial competence as a matter of
"property and civil rights in the province" or as a matter of a
"merely local or private nature in the province."77 The federal Act,
which followed shortly thereafter, prohibited a number of activities
on Sundays, but the principal sections created exemptions. 78 For
example, section 8 made it a punishable offence to run or conduct
Sunday excursions "except as provided by any provincial Act or law
now or hereafter in force." An Act passed in Manitoba in 1923 to
amend the Lord's Day Act enacted in section 1 that it should be
lawful to run or conduct Sunday excursions to resorts within the
province.79 The validity of this legislation was challenged in Lord's
Day Alliance of Canada v. Attorney General for Manitoba.8 0  The
Privy Council deemed it relevant to ask "whether or not it would
have been within the competence of the Legislature of Manitoba
effectively to enact it had there been on this subject of Sunday
excursions no previous Dominion legislation at all," in order to
determine if this was a statute "in force" within the meaning of the
reservation.81 This meant it had to be classified as other than
criminal law, which seemed unlikely in light of the Privy Council's
7 6 Attorney General of Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway, [1903] AC. 524 (P.C.).
77 Hogg, supra, note 41 at 305.
78 Lord's Day Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 153.
79 R.S.M. 1913, c. 119.
80 [1925] A. 384 (P.c.).
81 Mhid at 392, per Lord Blanesburgh speaking for the unanimous five member bench.
[VOL 26 NO. 1
Lotteiy and Gaming Laws
decision in A.G. for Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway.8 2
Nonetheless, the Privy Council managed to find that the Manitoba
statute was valid provincial legislation, although the rationale is far
from convincing or comprehensible:
Legislative permission to do on Sunday things or acts which persons of stricter
sabbatarian views might regard as Sabbath breaking is no part of the criminal law
where the acts and things permitted had not previously been prohibited. Such
permission might aptly enough be described as a matter affecting "civil rights in the
Province" or as one of "a merely local nature in the Province.8 3
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Lord Blanesburgh
continued:
[W]hat the Parliament of Canada may do in this matter it may also forbear to do,
and permissive Provincial legislation effective for its purpose, because the
Parliament of Canada has not previously intervened at all, can be no less effective
after such irltervention if by its very terms the previous liberty of the Provinces in
this matter remains unaffected. In each case, the Provincial Legislature is exercising
a power which, in the one case by silence and in the other case in words, the
Parliament of Canada has left intact.8
4
What the Privy Council seemed to be saying here is that
because Sunday activities were not criminal until the federal
legislation was passed in 1906 and because that statute preserved
provincial powers in this sphere, the federal Act did not expand
provincial jurisdiction as a true interdelegation would, and it
therefore constituted valid referential legislation.
As E.A. Driedger indicates, the decision has inherent
weaknesses8 5 First, the form was delegation. That is, the statutory
formula "except as provided by any provincial Act or law now or
hereafter in force' constituted an express invitation to the
legislatures to make exceptions to criminal offences. Further, to
determine the competence of a provincial statute enacted after the
federal Act, the statute should be read in its whole context which
must include that federal Act. That fact, in Driedger's view, is
82 [1903] AC. 524 (P.C.).
83 Supra, note 81.
84 bid at 394.
85 Driedger, supra, note 63 at 706.
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relevant in determining the "pith and substance" of the provincial
legislation. Even if it is an Act that the province could enact apart
from the federal statute, it might not in this context be related to
any of the stated heads of provincial powers. Looked at from this
perspective, the Manitoba statute, standing alone, hardly made sense.
Examined rationally, what it did was define what is not a crime.86
Accordingly, the province was exercising a delegated power.
Even accepting the judgement in Lord's Day Alliance at face
value, it is arguably of questionable worth in assessing the validity of
s. 190 of the Code. In that section, there is no question of
Parliament coming fresh to the field of prohibiting lotteries and
gaming and preserving "intact" a valid provincial power. The
prohibition of gambling has been part of Canadian criminal law since
the colonial era. Thus, although Driedger maintains that section 190
is not delegation because, in the absence of the prohibition, a
legislature could regulate lotteries as being property and civil
rights,87 if one applies his criticisms of Lord's Day Alliance, his
position is untenable. Existing by itself, the provincial regulation of
lottery schemes tells only half the story. The federal legislation
enables the provinces to act in a sphere from which they would
otherwise be excluded.
A more recent examination of the format of the Canadian
Lord's Day Act by the Supreme Court of Canada basically duplicated
the Privy Council position. In Lord's Day Alliance of Canada v.
Attorney General for British Columbia,8 8 the court unanimously
upheld the validity of a Vancouver by-law exempting the
municipality from the operation of part of the Lord's Day Act. It
was adjudged to be a "misconception" of the operation of the Act to
say that its effect was to create a delegation of federal power to the
provinces. In Rand J.'s view, it could not be open to serious debate
86 id
87bid at 705.
88 11959] S.C.R. 497.
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that Parliament may limit the operation of its own legislation and
may do so upon any event or condition.8 9
P.W. Hogg and P.C. Weiler, both eminent constitutional
scholars, are critical of this decision in a way that is also relevant for
section 190 of the Code. For example, Hogg comments that, if the
making of a Sunday observance law is a matter of criminal law
outside provincial competence, as was decided in Hamilton Street
Raihvay, then the repeal of a Sunday observance law is equally a
matter of criminal law outside provincial competence. The
Vancouver by-law had no significance except as a removal of a
criminal prohibition that is outside provincial competence as surely
as the imposition of a criminal prohibition. He concludes that the
decision is inconsistent with the Nova Scotia Interdelegation caseP °
Similarly, Weiler characterizes the opting-out clause in the Lord's
Day Act as amounting, functionally, to Parliament delegating to
provincial legislatures the power to amend its criminal law in
accordance with different and changing sentiments in the respective
provinces?'
In true referential legislation, where Parliament adopts a
particular piece of existing provincial legislation for its own use, it is
easy enough to distinguish it from an interdelegation. It is, in K
Lysyk's words, "a legislative short-cut. 92  Where future provincial
enactments are involved, however, the incorporation is, in reality,
delegation by another name. Judicial ingenuity has, however,
confined the prohibition against interdelegation to a narrow range.
As a result, "the doctrine is one which may test the ingenuity of, but
seems unlikely to confound, a careful legislative draftsman."93
89 Abid at 509-510.
90 Hogg, supra, note 41 at 306-307.
91 P.C. Weiler, 'Mhe Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism" (1973) 23
U.T.L3. 307 at 315.
92 K. Lysyk, 'The Interdelegation Doctrine: A Constitutional Paper Tiger?" (1969) 47
Can. B. Rev. 271 at 274.
93 Ibil at 277.
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Nonetheless, Weiler cautions us that, because the distinction
between referential or conditional legislation and interdelegation is
essentially one of name rather than substance, the Supreme Court
has left itself free to resurrect the latter when and if it may wish to
do so some time in the future 4 Section 190 would be an
interesting test case.
M CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
By limiting the interdelegation doctrine to such narrow
confines, the courts have facilitated constitutional flexibility. In
effect, they have conceded that the executives of federal and
provincial governments are primarily responsible for the distribution
of legislative authority where there is mutual agreement.95 One
viewpoint is that this means of effecting informal constitutional
change is essential to national survival. Co-operative federalism
through federal-provincial negotiations and agreements allows an
ongoing redistribution of powers without recourse to the courts or
the formal amending process 6
In contrast to this are the costs associated with constitutional
flexibility. De jure or de facto delegation runs the risk of creating
either an overpowerful central government or a toothless federation.
It may encourage pressure by one level of government on the other
to transfer powers? 7 As previously stated, constitutional flexibility,
in the guise of co-operative federalism, reduces the accountability of
governments to their legislative bodies and electorates and gives
politicians plausible reasons for failing to act when action is clearly
needed! 8  The fundamental defect of flexibility is, as Smiley
94 Weiler, supra, note 91 at 317-318.
95
.1bid. at 317.
96 Hogg, supra, note 41 at 106-107.
97 Canadian Bar Association, Toward a New Canada (1978) 66-67, quoted in J.E.
Magnet, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 93.
98 Smiley, supra, note 29 at 53.
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indicates, "that the federal system is cut adrift from its constitutional
base and becomes a regime shaped decisively by the bargaining
powers of the federal and provincial governments rather than by
legal norms."
99
The transfer of power over lottery and gaming law
concretizes these concerns. Public discussion and consultation in the
law reform process was precluded by federal-provincial executive
action; federal control over an area of criminal law was exchanged
for provincial cash; but the dubious constitutional validity of this
transaction appears virtually irrelevant and unnoticed in public fora.
991bL at 54.
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